“THE INSTITUTION OF SPIES”
in: THE KAUTILYA LECTURES
Delivered initially in [date:-336|magadha] at Takṣaśilā, Gandhāra to the following students:
Transcribed later from memory by Śrībhānu for the benefit of the Yavana girl Tara.
Edited and organized at the word of Professor Cāṇakya by the Yavana lady Tara.
The security of a state depends on the loyalties of its elements of sovereignty: of the king, the minister, the treasury, the army, the fort, the country and the allies. There are numerous means of securing such loyalties, and there are numerous means for them to be secured or seized by the enemy. This game played between a king and his enemy is termed war.
A formal declaration does not mark the start of war, similarly a peace treaty does not mark its end, only that of open war. War is perpetual, in one form or the other, and a king cannot rest even after he has completed a conquest, for the continued possession of an article requires continued active participation in such war as it persists.
It is then asked: how can such mighty forces – a great army, great wealth, a great population and country, large numbers of secure fortresses, foreign kings, the intellect of ministers – be made loyal to the will of a king alone?
Bhāradvāja says the king must be like a lion in the forest: even though he is small in number, he is far too powerful to be defeated by animals that are more numerous.
Parāśara says he must be like a mahout controlling an elephant: even though he is weaker than the elephant, he is able to control it by virtue of his position and tools.
But these are not correct: a king need not be the mightiest of his country in either dimension of masculine strength: intellectual, physical or otherwise; indeed, such strengths may be suited to other economic pursuits than kingship. Nor may a country be compared to an elephant, as unlike an elephant it contains men with intellect and technology equal or superior to that of the king.
Thus, I say he must be like a sluice in a canal – or like any other machine.
“I believe that control over a large army requires a larger army,” says Pabbata, “And likewise for a treasury, a country, a fort, an ally, and an intellect. Is this not so?”
No, as such demands would be infinite – even if you secure frontier articles in this way, the capital would still remain unsecured, as the chaotic political history of Magadha attests. And although the Persians claim that they have achieved stability by seizing powerful articles away from the countries they conquer, this alone cannot guarantee stability, as the king still assigns these articles to his subordinates; furthermore such centralization is an obstacle to mobility; as a result, Persia is weak at fighting on multiple fronts.
Much as a small sluice controls a far more powerful current, much as a lever controls the heavy projectiles loaded onto a catapult, much as a switch controls the flow of activity to a mill from a load raised by a water-wheel; similarly large elements may be controlled by small ones placed strategically and with intrigue.
Such small elements are termed spies.
Spies are secret by default, and are not allowed to admit their role or source of income to even those close to them – why?
“Because wise counsel lies in not revealing what one has determined to carry out,” says Candragupta.
The goal of spies is to ensure loyalty among the elements of sovereignty. To this end, they carry out the following three types of operations:
A spy may allure various members to betray the king and test their loyalties in this way. Such allurement may be in the form of persuasion, bribery, threats or deceit.
Thus the firmness, honesty, courage and intelligence of subjects may be tested by spies through the respective methods of gathering intelligence.
Spies may also conduct simpler listening and propaganda operations to the same end.
Likewise for spies scouting and affecting foreign countries and their articles.
Covert operations conducted by spies sabotage one or more of the enemy’s elements of sovereignty.
The following applies to all kinds of spying operations: just as a chariot may be pulled by an excess of horses tied in such a way that the vehicle is still functional when one of them is slain, at least three spies should be issued independently towards one goal without being revealed to each other, and their reports should be checked to agree – this way, spies can be made to spy on one another, and their loyalties can be checked.
Similarly, the spies and the espionage institutions should not be known to each other. This is to prevent the formation of conspiracies against the government, and to prevent captured spies from revealing information that compromises other spies or operations of the government.
Similarly, spies should be trained to use special pre-defined symbols – if their tasks are sufficiently generic, they should be trained to communicate in cipher.
Spies must be recruited from all walks of life. Those in all four stages of life – students, householders, recluses and ascetics – may all be recruited. Of chief importance are merchants, prostitutes, cooks and such servants, respected heroes and colleagues of the subject being spied on.
Criminals are particularly useful as spies, especially when it is not known to themselves that they are being used as spies. Such spies may also be used in situations where it is necessary to make a show of executing the spy after the operation is conducted.
Finally, a king may keep a known traitor, corrupt official, criminal or incompetent in his government for several reasons, including: pooling of intelligence about other traitors from those who associate with the known traitor, centrally manipulating such other traitors through the known traitor, use as a scapegoat in public relations disasters, use as fodder in various operations.